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INTRODUCTION 
Recently independent Papua New Guinea shares many of the 
f e a t u r e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of other developing nat ions : reli-
i 
ance on foreign aid to sustain government e x p e n d i t u r e , 
rapid population growth, l imited i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e , con-
s i d e r a b l e cultural d i v e r s i t y , few s k i l l e d indigenous person-
n e l , and growing reg ional d i s p a r i t i e s in income and educa-
tion and services . 
However, Papua New Guinea i s fortunate in that i t l acks 
the extreme poverty which troubles many Third World r e g i o n s . 
I t s population density i s r e l a t i v e l y low, and the people are 
largely s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n food production . In contrast to 
many former c o l o n i e s , urbanizat ion has proceeded at a f a i r l y 
slow pace in Papua New Guinea , and v i l l a g e peoples have 
1. As a lways , I am greatly indebted to my husband, Martin 
Z e l e n i e t z , for the valuable ins ight which has helped to 
r e f i n e my arguments. A d d i t i o n a l l y , I must thank Len 
G e r t l e r , Nicholas Pano, Sa l ly Lerner , and Simon and R i ta 
S a u l e i for comments and encouragement, both in good 
measure. F i n a l l y , I cannot forget the help and k indness 
of the people of Ongaia who give it a l l meaning. 
2. According to the National Public Expenditure Plan {P. N. G. , 
1 9 7 8 ) , some U0% of the operat ing budget i s f inanced by a 
d i r e c t grant from the Austral ian government. 
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clung tenaciously to t r a d i t i o n a l pract ices and b e l i e f s . 
While wage labour migration is a common enough phenomenon, 
it tends not to result in a rapidly growing urban popula-
t i o n : in a process of c i r c u l a r migration , migrants return 
to their home v i l l a g e s a f t e r a few years of work in town 
(Grant and Z e l e n i e t z , u. I f f t C ) . These f e a t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g a 
renewable resource base of considerable p o t e n t i a l , enhance 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that Papua New Guinea may e s t a b l i s h some 
level of se l f-rel iance i f population growth can be cont-
r o l l e d . But the government must also attempt to ra i se the 
l e v e l of income-earning exports s i g n i f i c a n t l y i f the impor-
tation of foreign aid i s to be reduced . 
To attempt to r e l i e v e some of the c o u n t r y ' s problems and 
ensure a moderate level of economic growth, the government 
of Papua New Guinea has adopted a policy for rural agr icul-
tural development (P. N .G . , 1976 ; 1 9 7 4 ) . The concern with 
rural development i s not e n t i r e l y new; i t c h a r a c t e r i z e d 
3 
administrat ion policy under the A u s t r a l i a n s as well . How-
ever , desp ite repeated , and often i n t e n s i v e , e f f o r t s to 
bring development to v i l l a g e people , the expansion of cash 
crop production has been q u i t e l imited in many a r e a s . While 
many Highlanders have prof i ted s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h e i r 
crops of c o f f e e , tea and pyrethrum (Woulik , 1 9 7 3 ) , c o a s t a l 
peoples have often shown a considerable reluctance to 
3. In 1965 the fciorld Bank prepared such a development, stra-
tegy for Papua New Guinea ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, 1 9 6 5 ) . 
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increase their production of cash crops (Harding , 1 9 7 1 ) . 
In t h i s paper , I wil l examine some of the reasons for the 
lack of development in one area of the province of West New 
B r i t a i n . Perhaps this a n a l y s i s , i l l u s t r a t e d by several case 
s t u d i e s of f a i l e d development pro jects , w i l l demonstrate the 
onerous task confronting development planners and others who 
hope to see Papua New Guinea develop to the point where i t 
can be assured of some degree of se l f-rel iance while offer-
ing i ts people an improved standard of l i v i n g . In the con-
cluding remarks I suggest that c a r e f u l planning and the con-
s i d e r a t i o n of local needs , d e s i r e s and a s p i r a t i o n s might 
avo id , remove or undermine impediments to development i n 
t h i s reg ion . 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE KILENGE ABEA 
5 
Kilenge i s the coastal area of the north-west tip of the 
i s land of New Br i ta in (see Map 1 ) . The Kilenge people , some 
one thousand in t o t a l , inhabit three contiguous v i l l a g e s : 
Ongaia , Portne, and K i lenge . They are r e l a t i v e l y self-suf-
f i c i e n t swidden h o r t i c u l t u r a l i s t s , c u l t i v a t i n g their crops 
H-. I must note, however, that the Tolai of East New B r i t a i n 
have attained a r e l a t i v e l y high level of development . 
While much of their success results from e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l 
a c t i v i t i e s , they a l s o produce much of the cocoa grown 
for market (Epste in , 1 9 7 2 ) . 
3• The research for this paper was carried out in the v i l l a g e 
of Onga ia , in the K i l e n g e area of Papua New G u i n e a , from 
March 1977 u n t i l January 1978 with Martin E e l e n i e t z 
(McMaster U n i v e r s i t y ) . 
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of t a r o , yams, sweet p o t a t o e s , manioc and bananas on the 
s l o p e s of Mount T a l a v e . P r i m a r i l y the K i l e n g e s e e them-
s e l v e s as gardeners ( f a r m e r s ) , but they a l s o f i s h and h u n t , 
and they keep domestic p i g s , dogs and f o w l . 
Because they have been i n c o n t a c t with w h i t e s s i n c e the 
turn of t h e c e n t u r y , the p r o c e s s e s of induced change are not 
new to the K i l e n g e . V a r i o u s c e n t r a l governments have intro-
duced new p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and l e a d e r s h i p r o l e s . The 
Germans i n i t i a t e d the p r o c e s s whereby Hew Guinea v i l l a g e r s 
p a r t i c i p a t e d in the broader economy by imposing a head t a x . 
During World War I I the Americans s t i m u l a t e d economic aspi-
r a t i o n s by f l a u n t i n g t h e i r f a n t a s t i c technology and w e a l t h . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has c o n s i s t e n t l y encouraged cash crop 
p r o d u c t i o n . In the K i l e n g e a r e a , such economic i n f l u e n c e s 
have r e s u l t e d in l a r g e s c a l e p l a n t i n g of coconut t r e e s . 
COPRA PRODUCTION 
!1ost v i l l a g e r s have ready access to cash only through the 
p r o d u c t i o n of c o p r a . Almost everyone owns , or can c o l l e c t 
from, s e v e r a l coconut t r e e s . Through copra p r o d u c t i o n any-
one can earn an income because the p r o c e s s i n g r e q u i r e s l i t -
7 
t i e s k i l l or technology . However, when we c o n s i d e r the s i z e 
6. A few v i l l a g e r s are employed by the l o c a l m i s s i o n , and 
o t h e r s r e c e i v e small i r r e g u l a r r e m i t t a n c e s from rela-
t i v e s working in town. There a r e a l s o i n f r e q u e n t oppor-
t u n i t i e s to earn soue money carrying goods or c o p r a . 
7 . A l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d for s p l i t t i n g the c o c o n u t s i s a bush 
k n i f e and a sharpened s t i c k . Dry ing the nuts i s only 
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of the community (about 200 h o u s e h o l d s ) , and the number of 
8 
mature coconut trees in the area (a minimum of 3 0 , 0 0 0 ) , we 
see that r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e copra i s marketed, Annually 
thousands of coconuts are l e f t to rot , and by a l l accounts 
the p o t e n t i a l copra resources are grossly under-exploited . 
One reason for such l imited production may be the fact that 
people have minimal cash needs : they are reguired to pay low 
annual taxes ($10 per adult male) and publ ic school f e e s ; 
they buy u t e n s i l s , soap , razors , c l o t h i n g , and tobacco ; they 
buy l u x u r i e s such as r i c e , t inned f i s h , f l o u r , tea and 
sugar . Their gardens produce enough to feed everyone , and 
cash is needed only for the ' e x t r a s ' . Consequently , a 
family can e a s i l y manage with the cash earned from the manu-
facture and sale of a f a i r l y small amount of copra , perhaps 
f i f t y pounds a month (an investment of ten to twelve man-
hours of l a b o u r ) . There i s l i t t l e incent ive to produce more 
than i s necessary , and people certainly f i n d no i n t r i n s i c 
s a t i s f a c t i o n in producing copra . 
s l i g h t l y more complicated . In good weather the copra 
may be s u n / a i r dried on a rack outside the house . In 
inclement weather , or for l arge g u a n t i t i e s of c o p r a , a 
dr ier can be used : i t cons ists of bamboo or wire racks 
over a wood f i r e . 
8 . T h e most recent census of coconut trees to which we had 
access (the Patrol Report of 1966) i n d i c a t e s that there 
were approximately 2 0 , 0 0 0 bearing and non-bearing trees 
in the area. Based on planting rates and the average 
number of trees owned per f a m i l y , our estimate i s a con-
servat ive attempt to update the e a r l i e r f i g u r e s . 
9. We lack accurate f i g u r e s on the amount of copra s o l d , but 
would estimate that i t i s not l ikely more than 200 tons 
per year , including that produced by the mission . 
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Large-scale copra production did not real ly begin in 
K i lenge until the 1 9 5 0 ' s and 1 9 6 0 * 3 , when the Paramount 
10 
Luluai of the a r e a , a powerful leader now dead , ordered 
a l l men to plant l i n e s of coconuts . T h i s leader was a very 
progress ive man, concerned with v i l lage development, out to 
impress the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and determined to make the peo-
ple p a r t i c i p a t e in cash cropping . He told people where to 
plant t h e i r t rees , without regard to who owned the land to 
be p l a n t e d , and he forced them to get r id of the ir domestic 
p igs u n t i l the s e e d l i n g s had properly taken . But now that 
t h i s powerful man i s dead , people worry about the ownership 
of t h e i r coconuts : to whom do the trees r i g h t f u l l y belong? 
(To the men who planted them, or to the owners of the 
ground?) Because of th is i n s e c u r i t y of t i t l e , there i s l i t -
t l e e f f o r t to c lear between the p l a n t a t i o n l i n e s , or to 
regular ly collect from the t r e e s . With the Paramount Lulua i 
gone, and with a subsequent lack o f e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p in 
the v i l l a g e s , people are under no pressure to plant new 
l i n e s of trees for their ch i ldren or g r a n d c h i l d r e n . 
E r r a t i c shipping has always been a problem for K i l e n g e 
II 
copra producers . U n t i l recently when a shipping l i n e 
ID. Such leaders were appointed by the Americans and Austra-
l i a n s immediately fol lowing World War I I . Z e l e n i e t z 
i s currently preparing a doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n in 
which he analyses contemporary problems of l e a d e r s h i p 
in Kilenge . 
H In the 1 9 6 0 ' s . Burns Phi lp scheduled a ship to stop at 
K i lenge at s ix week i n t e r v a l s . Patrol Reports show 
that the Captain was reluctant to cal l at K i l e n g e 
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began to stop r e g u l a r l y , there was often no way to get copra 
out to the market. Several times people heeded c a l l s from 
Mission and government personnel and v i l l a g e leaders to pro-
duce c o p r a , then watched i t rot on the wharf await ing trans-
port that seldom came. 
Most people d i s l i k e copra production . When the Germans 
f i r s t v i s i t e d the area in the 1 8 9 0 ' s , they took men away to 
work in the copra p l a n t a t i o n s of the G a z e l l e P e n i n s u l a , 
engendering a resentment which s t i l l l i n g e r s . V i l l a g e r s not 
only a s s o c i a t e copra production with the unpleasant memory 
of forced labour , but they also begrudge the time i t robs 
from the highly valued garden work. People will make copra 
only i f they need money, or i f it i s b u s i n e s s day and they 
are required to work for t h e i r group. Only a few v i l l a g e r s 
are large-scale producers , and while the ir f e l l o w s may hold 
them as exemplars of i d e a l behaviour , few people real ly envy 
the hours put in s h e l l i n g and breaking nuts , and tending 
the drying f i r e . 
World market pr ices also a f f e c t levels of copra produc-
t i o n . When the market pr ice is high and s t a b l e , people w i l l 
produce copra ; when the price drops to low l e v e l s , produc-
tion i s dramatically c u r t a i l e d . Lows have a l i n g e r i n g aft-
e r - e f f e c t : even once p r i c e s recover , production tends to 
because of the small amount of copra to be loaded . 
The same reports note that the K i l e n g e were loath to 
produce copra because the s h i p was an i r r e g u l a r and 
infrequent v i s i t o r . 
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remain at a low level for some time. 
The Ki lenge rarely save cash earned through copra produc-
t i o n ; instead they spend i t within a few days at local trade 
s tores . 
While many stores and small bus inesses have set up opera-
tions in K i l e n g e , few are e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l . In f a c t , 
only one , a trade store operated p r i v a t e l y by an immigrant 
to the Kilenge a r e a , seems to produce any p r o f i t . The oth-
e r s , set up by ' b u s i n e s s groups ' under a government scheme 
aimed at v i l l a g e development through cooperative e n t e r p r i s e , 
have probably served more to discourage development than to 
d irect i t . The ' b u s i n e s s group ' i s a c l a s s i c example of a 
good idea that went wrong. 
BUSINESS GROUPS 
The Paramount Luluai organized the f i r s t bus iness group 
in the Kilenge area in the early 1 9 6 0 ' s . I t was a coopera-
t i v e , ca l led the s o c i e t y , designed to market copra and to 
acquire goods, or ' c a r g o ' , f or s a l e in the v i l l a g e . A l l the 
12-
men of Ongaia and Portne v i l l a g e s jo ined . The Society i s 
s t i l l f u n c t i o n i n g , but i t has never been very s u c c e s s f u l . 
Several times it has been on the brink of bankruptcy , and 
only hasty ref inancing has been able to save i t . There is no 
12.Most men of Kilenge v i l l a g e chose not to j o i n because 
they had a tradestore in the ir v i l l a g e through which 
they were able to market the ir copra . 
evidence that the business makes any p r o f i t , despite the 
volume of its t r a n s a c t i o n s and i t s high p r i c e s . No d i v i d e n d s 
have been paid to members in years . I t s account books are a 
d i s a s t e r , and there is much local speculat ion that the sto-
rekeepers are taking the p r o f i t s o f f the top in high salar-
ies . 
In the early 1970*3 there was another round of bus iness 
group formation , t h i s time with the administrat ion encourag-
ing k i n s h i p groups to pool their labour and resources to 
increase production. The government hoped that such coopera-
tives would reduce tensions over land use for cash c r o p p i n g , 
s ince group-owned land could then be planted with group-
owned, instead of indiv idual ly-owned , crops . A d d i t i o n a l l y , 
jo int savings might lead to c a p i t a l formation and p o t e n t i a l 
reinvestment in new v i l l a g e endeavours . The v i l l a g e r s of 
Ongaia formed two groups , loosely based on k i n s h i p l i n e s . 
Each group set up a savings account for the proceeds from 
copra s a l e s , b u i l t a copra d r i e r , and set about producing 
copra . Member-families donated nuts and labour to the pro-
cessing e f f o r t . Proceeds from the copra s a l e s went d i r e c t l y 
into group c o f f e r s . As each group bu i l t up s u b s t a n t i a l sav-
i n g s , it aspired to open i t s own trade s t o r e . In neighbour-
ing v i l l a g e s , several groups started stores (with the finan-
13 
c i a l a id of kinsmen working in t o w n ) , but in Ongaia 
13. In Portne , a v i l l a g e of the same s i z e as O n g a i a , seven 
kin-based business groups were o r g a n i z e d . However, by 
1977 , four of the groups had f a i l e d t o t a l l y and the ir 
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neither of the groups was so successful. People became dis-
couraged when they continually contributed to group e f forts , 
but got nothing in return. 
For the business groups which operate trade stores in 
other villages , the economic situation is precarious. Mem-
bers make copra to sell in order to buy goods for their 
stores. She goods are then available for sale to the whole 
community; no special discount is arranged for group mem-
bers. When the cargo is sold , the members make more copra to 
buy more goods. The process i s endless: make copra, buy 
cargo, make copra, buy more cargo. The observer asks him-
sel f : where is all the accumulated capital going? It appears 
that it i s , quite l i terally , eaten up. Storekeepers are 
giving goods or money away; there is never any true profit . 
In the lingua franca (Neo-Melanesian Pidgin) any gross 
receipts are called ' p r o f i t ' , but proceeds are seldom suffi-
cient even to meet expenses. Perhaps the pricing of goods i s 
inadequate to cover costs. At any rate, none of these 
group-owned stores seems to make money, and the members are 
locked into a never-ending cycle of production without capi-
tal accumulation. Why do they keep producing, even i f only 
at a fa ir ly low level? They do i t for the prestige which 
accrues to those who own a trade store. For the Kilenge, a 
trade store is a symbol of success, even if it s its empty 
without stock for eight months of the year. People see 
members had joined the three remaining groups. 
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stores as one of the greatest accomplishments of the white 
man's culture; stores owned by Europeans are always full of 
cargo. Anything one could ever want can be found in the 
trade store. For the sake of their trade store, people are 
willing to work for no prof it , although not often enough to 
substantially increase village production. 
In the village of Ongaia, the two business groups lack 
trade stores. Members feel the shame of being left behind 
by other villages which already have several trade stores 
il 
operated by business groups.. They accuse their sons and 
brothers working in town of being tight-fisted and fail ing 
to contribute the needed capital for the opening of a store. 
However, it i s not through want of trying that capital accu-
mulation has failed in Ongaia, but through the foibles of 
particular individuals, and unfortunate twists of fate . A 
few years ago, Ongaian men working in Vunapope and Habaul 
decided to pool their money to finance a trade store in the 
village . Each fortnight they contributed money from their 
pay; the senior man of the group handled the collection. 
About a year later , men in the village asked for the money 
because they were ready to start the store. However, the 
14. The Society trade store sits on Ongaia land and is more 
or less controlled by Ongaians. However, it is seen 
as 'belonging' to all of i ts members, and thus is not 
'Ongaian ' . I t is not properly 'of the v i l lage ' alt-
hough it is ' i n the v i l l a g e ' . There was an abortive 
attempt in 1977 to purchase all the shares owned by 
non-Ongaians so that the village could at last have 
i ts own store. 
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freezer and fisting net, and planned to make its fortune by 
marketing the deep-sea f ish i ts members would catch. Unfor-
tunately, this dream also turned into an expensive nightmare 
when the boat motor broke down and the parts to fix it were 
IS 
not readily available . To add insult to injury, the group 
dissolved during our stay in Ongaia, amidst allegations of 
theft and corruption. One man, echoing the whispered con-
cerns of many, left the group saying he was tired of con-
stantly making copra for the group and never getting any-
thing back for his effort ; he took with him ten sacks of 
marketable copra and kept the profits as payment for his 
labour. 
Indeed, there seems to be l i t t l e incentive, other than 
»fc 
the shouted orders which are commonplace on business day,' 
to work for the business groups. Ken, women and sometimes 
children, contribute labour and coconuts, but get no mater-
ial return: no discounts at the trade store, no dividends, 
no capital accumulation which can be put to a useful purpose 
in a productive investment. The potential for capital accu-
mulation, increased production, and concerted group effort 
toward development, which the administration foresaw for the 
15, In the brief period while the motor boat, was operative, 
the freezer broke down and several catches spoiled 
before they could be shipped to market. 
16. The former Paramount Luluai esablished Thursday as "busi-
ness day" , a day when people would work for the 
Society or smaller business groups, but not for indi-
vidual profit . 
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business groups, has f i z z l e d in Kilenge . Men who are seri-
ously intent on economic development in the v i l lage have 
started their own copra enterprises , e ither as ind iv iduals 
or as a small group of s i b l i n g s , and have abandoned the 
business groups as a hopeless waste of e f f o r t . 
ALTERNA1III CASH CROPS 
On several different occasions there have been well-in-
tentioned attempts to reduce reliance on copra as the only 
cash crop. New crops have been introduced in an e f fort to 
d i v e r s i f y , but have had a startling lack of success. The 
three case studies which follow i l lustrate the problems. 
Cocoa 
In the 1960 's the administration tried to encourage the 
planting of cocoa {cacao) . Agricultural representatives gave 
people seeds and advice about how to tend the plants . How-
ever, in the f i rst season a disease attacked the bushes, and 
many of the plants died . Pigs uprooted and destroyed bushes 
planted near the v i l lage . People never planted new cocoa 
because their fellow v i l lagers were not willing to fence the 
ir 
omnivorous pigs (regardless of repeated rulings by the 
Local Government Council requiring the enclosure of domesti-
17.When pigs are fenced they have to be given more food 
since they are unable to forage during the day; peo-
ple are reluctant to create extra work for themselves 
by restricting the scavenging a c t i v i t i e s of their 
p igs . 
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cated p i g s ) . 
Also, there were problems with the planning of the cocoa 
project . No provisions were made to establish a fermentary 
in the area, despite the fact that cocoa beans cannot be 
marketed until they are processed. In fact , v i l l a g e r s 
informed us that the agricultural of f icer had begun the pro-
ject on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e , and his superiors subsequently 
castigated hi® for poor planning. 
C h i l i Peppers 
In another development project in the mid-1970 's , the 
agricultural o f f i c e r d istr ibuted seeds for c h i l i peppers 
with assurances that people could earn a l iost $3 for a small 
bag of the sun-dried product. The plants required l i t t l e 
care, and could be planted in gardens with other food crops. 
Consequently, many families joined the project and planted 
the peppers. When the f i r s t crop matured and d r i e d , some 
v i l lagers took the peppers to the agricultural extension 
o f f icer at Cape Gloucester , the government stat ion . He told 
them he would have to find out what to do with the product; 
since he had been given no directive to purchase the pep-
pers, he would have to check with headquarters before act-
ing . Villagers returned home with their bags of peppers. 
After having gone to the trouble of planting , harvesting and 
processing the new crop, they were greatly disappointed and 
angry to learn that there was no way to market the product. 
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This episode severely undermined faith and confidence in 
the agricultural o f f i c e r ; most people will no longer believe 
a word that he te l ls them, nor are they wil l ing to partici-
pate in any projects which he in i t iates . 
Betel Ifut 
In one of the few indigenously-organized projects to 
develop a new cash crop industry , several v i l lagers decided 
to market betel nut. In Lae c i ty , where there i s a constant 
demand for the stimulant, a seller can get a good price for 
fresh betel . once shipping from Kilenge to Lae became regu-
lar , several men went to town to sell their b e t e l . Their 
kinsmen and neighbours also cut betel so that there would be 
plenty to market, and everyone might be able to earn some 
easy cash . But, when the vendors returned, they had l i t t l e 
cash in their pockets; they had spent the proceeds of a l l 
the s a l e s . Those who had sent betel for sale gained no mon-
etary returns for their e f f o r t s . Villagers were d is i l lu-
sioned. They are now convinced that the only way to receive 
money from the sale of their goods is to go to Lae to s e l l 
the betel nut themselves. Unfortunately, the high price of 
passage on the ship makes ind iv idual marketing junkets imp-
ract ical ly expensive. Thus , the potential of a highly luc-
rative crop is stymied by the logist ics of aarketing and the 
inherent corruption potential of the kinship networks. 
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From these examples we see that problems of plant 
d isease , marketing, processing, and village custom have dif-
ferent ia l ly contributed to the fa i lure of various attempts 
to introduce new cash crops and new inst itut ions for produc-
tion into the Kilenge area . 
OTHER DEVELOPSEST EFFORTS 
Most of the time, energy and money invested in attempts 
to develop the Kilenge area has been aimed at potential cash 
crop industries . However, there have been sporadic e f f o r t s 
to stimulate development by other means. 
£ES.£t Production. 
For a brief period in the mid-1970's v i l lage a r t i s t s were 
able to market their crafts in a scheme organized by a local 
entrepreneur. Earlier v i s i t s by anthropologists and museum 
personnel collecting ethnographic specimens convinced vil-
lagers that there was a demand for their a r t i f a c t s . The 
enterprising businessman encouraged his kinsmen to produce 
art objects , and carried them to town for sale . There i s 
some question as to whether the artisans were ever reim-
bursed for their labour. In any event, the entrepreneur 
took i l l , and attributed his ailment to sorcery employed by 
v i l lagers jealous of his successful salesmanship. Fearing 
his l i f e , he stopped marketing local a r t i f a c t s , although he 
frequently claims to be contemplating renewed action . Con-
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sidering the quality of local craftsmanship and the growing 
market for ' pr imit ive ' art , there may be great potential in 
the development of a craft industry in Ki lenge . 
Village Market 
In 1976 the Catholic Mission at Kilenge set up a 'market ' 
where v i l lagers could s e l l surplus produce on Saturday morn-
ings. The Church believed that v i l lagers would be able to 
earn some cash by sel l ing to government employees at the 
hospital , school, and perhaps even to those at Cape Glouces-
ter , eighteen miles away. Vendors paid a small s t a l l fee 
which went into a village fund. Unfortunately, the market 
fa i led to live up to its promise. Purchases by outsiders 
were minimal, and vi l lagers ended up se l l ing to each other ; 
cash simply circulated within the v i l l a g e , and no new capi-
tal was received. The market, which v i l lagers saw as a 
v is ible symbol of urbanization and development, was unsuc-
c e s s f u l . In April 1977 the priest dismantled the s t a l l s to 
re-use the lumber for other purposes and the market ceased 
to function . 
Animal Husbandry 
The Mission has the only commercial pig herd in the 
Kilenge area. Very few v i l lagers raise pigs for sale at 
market. The demand for pork is high in the urban areas of 
Papua New Guinea where a large pig can fetch as much as 
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$300- However, tradit ional attitudes toward tha use of pigs 
prevents most people from attempting to market their ani-
mals. Pigs are essential objects of prestation and exchange 
in tradit ional a c t i v i t i e s . While they may be ind iv idual ly 
owned and tended, kinsmen have a claim on their ultimate 
use. To offer a pig for sale in the market i s to deny o n e ' s 
obl igations to o n e ' s kin which few men or women wil l do. 
Even a lucrative market has not resulted in a re-evaluation 
of p r i o r i t i e s . 
ht one time the Mission tried to i n i t i a t e a cattle pro-
ject in Kilenge. The priest planted special grass and beans 
for fodder , and purchased wire for fencing . He expected 
people to keep their pigs out of the pasture area, and 
requested help with the fencing . When pigs uprooted all the 
beans and people neglected to build the fence, the priest 
withdrew his f inanc ia l and moral support for the project . 
No cattle came to Kilenge , but a small herd is thriving at 
the patrol post at Cape Gloucester. 
WHY DOESN'T DEVELOPMENT WOBK? 
The general consensus of opinion of v i l l a g e r s , Mission 
and government personnel, and vis itors to the area i s that 
the economy of the Kilenge v i l l a g e s is s t a t i c . In a Papua 
New Guinea electric with the idea of development, Kilenge 
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goes nowhere. Cajoling from Mission and government person-
nel convinces villagers that they should blame themselves 
for lack of progress. But previous efforts to 'develop* 
seem to have sapped people's desire to try again , and have 
resulted in a latent cynicism which may be d i f f i c u l t to 
overcome. 
Virtually every week at one of the village meetings, the 
local government councillors or village elders harangue the 
If? 
people about the need for development,. for business. 
There is evidence of great concern to 'bring the village 
u p ' , and councillors frequently issue orders to villagers to 
produce copra to make money. Even the organization of the 
work week reflects dedication to the principle that village 
people should contribute to development: Monday i s set aside 
19 
for unpaid government labour, and Thursday i s 'business 
day' for copra production for the business groups. However, 
despite the talk , and regardless of the organization of the 
work week, copra production remains at a low level , and lit-
i s . In Pidgin, 'developmen' is almost purely economic {see 
Counts, 1968) , although it may be seen to result in 
social or political changes. While villagers may see 
development as inclusive of social as well as eco-
nomic services, they perceive their own role in the 
process primarily in terms of productivity. Although 
in the most general sense, I see development as an 
attempt to improve the standard of living in such a. 
way that it becomes self-sustaining, I have tended to 
follow local parlance in the use of the term in this 
paper. 
19,As Fisk (1975) indicates , this contribution to the 
national economy should not be underestimated. 
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tie is done to improve the economic base of the v i l l a g e . 
The observer must ultimately ask himself : why do people 
talk so much about development, as i f they truly craved i t , 
set aside two days for government and business work, create 
'business groups' and other organizations to stimulate pro-
duction , yet, at the same time, seem to d i s l ike ' b u s i n e s s ' 
work, neglect their coconut plantations , and never succeed 
in raising their production beyond a minimal level? The 
answers to these questions should become clear in the dis-
cussion which follows . 
PROBLEMS UITH IMPLEMENTING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN KILENGE 
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As i s so often the case in planning , many problems arise 
in program implementation at the local level . In Papua New 
Guinea, personnel sent to local patrol posts may have l i t t l e 
training or experience. Often they f ind themselves quite 
overworked or unable to deal with traditions very d i f f e r e n t 
from their own. They may lack the information, equipment 
and goods which they need to adequately f u l f i l the ir d u t i e s . 
Any shortfall experienced in project implementation r e f l e c t s 
on the local representative personally and on the government 
in general , but it is the local off icer who becomes the most 
obvious culprit in the eyes of local people. Villagers are 
often unaware of the problems which the development and 
agricultural off icers face , and they are unknowledgeable 
about the chain of delivery of which local representatives 
are only the terminal l ink . 
flany of the projects which local government representa-
tives must implement require an infrastructure which is 
missing at the village level : transport to market, developed 
technology, and expertise. The institutional outlets which 
are available are frequently unreliable. In a most notable 
example, administration o f f i c i a l s repeatedly encouraged 
Kilenge people to deposit their savings in the bank branch 
established at the patrol post at Cape Gloucester. Occa-
sionally the bank representative would come to the villages 
to collect peoples1 savings for deposit. When queried about 
the infreguency of his v i s i ts , he responded that he came 
only when there was insufficient cash in the t i l l to cover 
government workers' paychegues. I f people wanted to take 
money out of the bank they had to make their way the eigh-
teen miles to the patrol post; on arrival at the station 
they often discovered that the bank had no money to give out 
because it had disbursed a l l of i ts cash to honour the payc-
hegues of government employees. Needless to say, the 
Kilenge retain l i t t le faith in the legitimacy or re l iab i l i ty 
of such institutions . 
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All told , the delivery of programs and plans at the local 
level i s probably the weakest link in the development plan-
ning process in Papua New Guinea. Combined with local cus-
toms, inadeguate infrastructure can frequently become a 
intractable barrier to the forces of change and development. 
VILLiGS TRADITIONS 
Anthropologists who studied Paci f ic cultures often 
remarked that Melanesians were perhaps the primitive w o r l d ' s 
best business men, people who could turn a profit on any 
transaction . There was speculation that Melanesians would 
make f ine entrepreneurs because they had such a firm grasp 
of market principles . However, observations have not always 
borne out the optomistic predictions . Tradit ional market 
principles s t i l l operate in many parts of Melanesia , includ-
ing the Kilenge area , but they have not been transferred to 
the realm of the cash economy. The same men who were great 
successes in traditional exchange networks have often proven 
JLO 
inadequate entrepreneurs. 
In tradit ional exchange networks, wealth was not normally 
amassed to be held for lengthy periods ; it was rapidly 
redistr ibuted . In d istributing wealth through ceremonies or 
g i f t s , the 'b ig man' ( Sahl ins , 1963) could accumulate debts 
But see Epstein (1972) for an example of a re lat ive ly 
successful transformation among the Tolai of East New 
Britain , something of an exception to the generaliza-
tion. 
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for future repayment, as well as intangibles such as pres-
tige and respect. Wealth was for investment in consumables, 
intangibles and promises. The power of wealth was not in 
the owning, but in the giving {Haass, 1970 ) , for by giving 
the owner forced other people to acknowledge h i s superior-
ity . Thus, wealth was constantly in circulation in most 
Melanesian communities; every man was in debt to some people 
while a creditor to others. 
When Melanesians, for example the Kilenge, enter the cash 
economy, they carry with them many of these traditional 
ideas about the utility and the function of wealth. They 
accumulate capital , invest it in a business, but then pro-
ceed to uti l ize the investment for consumption and the 
accrual of prestige. The assets of the enterprise may be 
distributed in the same manner as traditional wealth, with a 
promise to repay {although at no definite time) and the 
tacit acknowledgement of the superiority of the entrepren-
eur. While traditional wealth exchanges generated further 
wealth transfers and the giver eventually received his due 
return on goods given, in monetary exchanges the obligation 
to reciprocate has proven less powerful. This may be due 
partially to the type of products involved in distribution 
via the new enterprises: these products are often utilita-
rian goods, such as foodstuffs , utensils and clothing. 
Traditionally , a kinsman would freely provide another with 
whatever food or other util itarian items he needed; such a 
gift between kin incurred no debt. Thus, the modern 
definitional problem for the entrepreneur and his kinsmen 
becomes 'what is the nature of this g i f t : i s it utilita-
II 
rian/non-debt creating, or wealth/debt-creating?* The 
businessman who distributes free food and other products to 
his kin may hope for , but cannot be certain of , later reci-
procation. Unwilling to deny his kinsmen access to the 
goods he controls, the storekeeper can never break even on 
his sales . lather than util ize his capital to create snore 
capital , he disburses it in favour of non-capital productive 
AX 
returns. In order to keep the enterprise functional , the 
owner must constantly contribute his own labour to produce 
new capital to invest in his business. Eventually he tires 
of the ceaseless and unprofitable labour, and the business 
lapses. It is a common enough pattern, and a problematic 
trend in Kilenge. 
Many of the reasons for the failure of agricultural 
and/or business development are to be found within the vil-
lage, particularly in the lack of incentive for progressive 
endeavour, and in the bel iefs which relegate such act iv it ies 
21.Even the distinction between utilitarian objects and 
wealth items can be blurred, as is the case with 
carved bowls from the Siassi Islands . Such bowls fig-
ure in most exchanges of wealth, but are also essen-
tial vessels for the serving of food. Thus, although 
an object may have ut i l i ty , it may also be classed as 
a wealth item. 
22.Levy (1953) discusses various problems of capital forma-
tion in non-modern societies . 
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to second-class status. In Kilenge, the only respectable 
work is garden work. Through the production of food, men 
and women earn the respect accorded adult members of 
society. Garden work is a duty, an obligation, an onerous 
task, but also a pleasure. On the other hand, the produc-
tion of copra has few merits in traditional terms. It is 
menial labour, with no redeeming social value other than the 
money it earns, and it is s t i l l viewed as an irksome task 
which whites imposed on native peoples. Copra production i s 
boring and tiresome work which gives no sat is fact ion . 
Furthermore, the prices received for copra are out of the 
control of the worker who is at the mercy of the market {or, 
more immediately, of the agency which markets his product). 
Traditional work patterns require seasonal pooled labour 
and cooperative effort . Kinsmen and neighbours help each 
other in the tasks which require intensive labour, such as 
the clearing of new gardens. As conjugal pairs, men and 
women form integral mutually-dependent labour partnerships. 
However, the labour requirements and practises of copra pro-
duction have not conformed to the customs of garden work. 
Copra production is usually the business of either an indi-
vidual or a nuclear family. It can be an inherently anti-
social , anti-community endeavour, as it isolates the worker 
interested in cash acquisition. Only since the introduction 
of 'business groups' has copra production been transformed 
into a potential group enterprise, but even cooperation has 
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not s i g n i f i c a n t l y altered a t t i t u d e s toward the production of 
copra , nor the amount produced. Perhaps people learned to 
see copra production as an i n d i v i d u a l or nuclear family 
bus iness in the years before business groups were organ-
i z e d . The i n i t i a l enthusiasm for the cooperat ive e f f o r t of 
bus iness group production d i ss ipated as i t became obvious 
that the business group organ i zat ion consumed resources but 
never produced anything . People were w i l l i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e 
in cooperative garden work because in that e f f o r t they 
received returns for their labour : food , r e s p e c t , convival-
i t y , and the reciprocated labour of other p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
But , in contr ibut ing his labour to group copra p r o d u c t i o n , 
the worker never gets equal returns ; h is input, i s always 
greater than what he can expect to receive .23 A man ' s incen-
t i v e to produce for the group is l imited by the perceived 
return for labour i n v e s t e d , and his i n c e n t i v e to produce for 
himself or h i s family is l imited by the perceived cost of 
such ant i-social act iv i ty and the perceived loss of time for 
l e i sure or other p u r s u i t s . 
I t i s also clear that t r a d i t i o n a l k i n s h i p o b l i g a t i o n s 
have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the incentive to increase pro-
duct ion . Throughout Papua New Guinea , the phenomenon of the 
24 
'wantok system' can dampen the enthusiasm for development . 
23. Men complain that they work hard and d i l i g e n t l y while 
others around them 1 g o l d b r i c k ' . In non-tradit ional 
work groups the standard of i n d i v i d u a l production 
eventually becomes that of the l e a s t productive mem-
ber . 
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Your wantok has the right to ask you for a i d , and you have 
the obligation to give to hi® if you are able . The proceeds 
of labour should be shared with kinsmen or wantoks who are 
in need. Ho man who has more than he needs for his own 
immediate requirements could conceivably deny a kinsman in 
need. I f he were to do so he would lose his self-respect, 
and people would complain of his miserliness. In tradi-
tional times this network of obligations served an essential 
purpose: it guaranteed an equitable distribution of food and 
goods, especially in tiaes of need. It meant that your kins-
men were obliged to look after you, and you them. When 
applied to the new cash economy, the wantok system operates 
much the same way. A man who makes copra and collects his 
earnings i s subject to the requests of kinsmen. I f he has 
any surplus money, he is obliged to share it . People see 
l i t t le incentive to produce extra copra because the earnings 
from it will have to be distributed among seedy kin, with 
the extra labour invested for nought. Furthermore, needy 
kin incur no true debt; although they may be politely 
requested to return the aid at some point in the future , 
they are under no obligation to do so. Kinsmen should share 
their goods freely and not expect to be fully and equitably 
reimbursed. Even a hard worker f inds it d i f f icult to accumu-
The concept of relatedness implied in the wantok system 
includes and assumes obligations to kinsmen, fellow-
villagers , fellow-clansmen, and those who speak the 
same language. 
late capital because he may be required to reinvest any sav-
ings in non-productive gi fts to kinsmen. 
For the operators of small businesses, the problem is 
compounded. Kinsmen may walk into a trade store and request 
gifts fro® the storekeeper. The storekeeper faces the 
dilemma of having to choose either to be a social outcast 
among his kin by refusing a legitimate request for a id , or 
to become a failed entrepreneur by acceeding to the endless 
demands. It is not easy to run a business; the social bind 
makes it d i f f icult for native people to operate successful 
enterprises in their own villages . 
furthermore, under the guise of the wantok system, much 
theft and corruption go unpunished. Unscrupulous men can 
steal from their kinsmen with impunity. Manipulation or 
improper dispersal of resources frequently frustrated 
efforts by groups of kinsmen to accumulate capital . However 
disgruntled, kinsmen do not complain openly about such fla-
grantly unsociable behaviour as the misappropriation of 
group funds. Charges are very seldom brought to the police 
because no one wants to be responsible for sending a kinsman 
to j a i l . While there are other means {such as sorcery) 
through which cheated individuals can bring justice to bear 
on thieves and scoundrels, one unfortunate experience can 
disincline men to re-attampt a pooling of capital . Because 
they fear they will be cheated of their money, people find 
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it d i f f icult to cooperate in order to accumulate the capital 
necessary to finance the development of the village . 
Sorcery is another practice also contributes to the ina-
bility to accumulate capital and to in it iate or sustain suc-
cessful enterprises. Throughout Papua New Guinea, i t i s the 
tool of jealous and envious men. Those who succeed in busi-
ness may become prey to the anger of jealous men who often 
employ sorcery to defeat a r ival . Any unusual i l lness or 
death in the family of a successful man can be attributed to 
the workings of envious men, and may discourage the entre-
preneur from continuing his financial pursuits . Fear of 
potential illness or death through sorcery serves as a 
disincentive to increase production beyond the minimal level 
necessary for immediate cash needs. I t also may limit inno-
vation in new and potentially high-status enterprises; many 
men are reluctant to put themselves into the entrepreneurial 
spotlight where they become visible targets for sorcery 
ci fc 3lC k • 
Local patterns of consumption and investment are not very 
conducive to development. People produce copra to earn cash 
to buy consumables. They save l i t t l e of the cash earned in 
the v i l lage , and invest only a minimal amount of the pri-
vately-earned cash in capital-productive enterprises. I f 
cash is 'invested* in anything, it will be in items for use 
in traditional practices. When people invest cash in trad-
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itional exchange networks, the returns will only be intangi-
bles such as prestige. They expect returns in kind for 
traditional items, such as pigs given in ceremonial 
exchanges, but minor items, such as garden or purchased 
food, do not engender debts. The principles which govern 
traditional exchanges are not directly applied to cash tran-
sactions. Only traditional wealth can create a truly obliga-
tory debt, and thus ensure a return on investment. People 
will not attempt to accumulate large sums of money to invest 
in village exchanges because there is no guarantee whatever 
that the money will be returned. Villagers use money only 
to buy goods for personal use or for investment in the accu-
mulation of prestige during ceremonial cycles where they do 
not expect a tangible return (Zelenietz and Grant, no date) . 
In contrast to the situation in other areas of Papua New 
Guinea, cash is not even an essential part of the brideprice 
payment in Kilenge. Where cash is included in a brideprice, 
it is seldom a large amount, and, because of the nature of 
the transaction, it cannot engender a debt. 
F inally , and perhaps most importantly, the Kilenge vil-
lages lack the progressive leadership required to stimulate 
development. Until 1973, one determined leader had managed 
to motivate people to plant and harvest coconuts, produce 
copra, build the government road, and try new crop experi-
25. For example, r ice , tea and sugar may be purchased for 
consumption during ceremonies. 
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stents. But, since his death, no effective leaders have 
emerged. Through forcefulness and his abil ity to inspire 
fear , the old leader could make people produce copra even 
when there was no guaranteed market for their product, pre-
sent leaders cannot increase production despite improved 
marketing opportunities. The Kilenge themselves believe 
that a lack of strong leadership prevents development in 
their area. Their philosophy i s that people have to be 
pushed {by a leader) to work for the improvement of the vil-
lage. It seems unlikely that a concerted effort toward vil-
lage development can begin unless effective leaders arise to 
direct the activities . Traditional patterns of leadership 
in Kilenge differ from the usual Melanesian ones where lead-
ership status is almost wholly achieved. In Kilenge, lead-
ership positions are ascribed, and continuing insistence 
that the leaders come from the proper ranks, as well as that 
they be of a certain minimum age, means that the range of 
leadership candidates is severely restricted. Fear of sor-
cery also hampers the activity of potential leaders who gen-
erally take a low profile and seldom make serious attempts 
to consolidate their positions. Without strong leaders to 
ensure that people devote additional labour to cash crop 
production and other forms of rural development, the village 
economies remain static . 
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THE SOLE OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 
To th is point 1 have mentioned wage labour migration only 
in passing , yet i t s role and influence in v i l lage develop-
26 
tent warrants brief discussion . 
Wage labour migration from Kilenge began as early as the 
turn of the century when the Germans were seeking workers 
for their plantations in the Gazelle Peninsula (Rabaul ) . 
There were relatively few volunteers in the early days of 
recruitment, but, as v i l l a g e r s became dependent on steel 
tools and enamoured of twist tobacco, cloth and tea , more 
men were tempted to migrate. Contracts lasted two or three 
years , with the bulk of the pay given at the termination of 
the work period. Migrants returned to the v i l lage laden 
with g i f t s for their kinsmen. 
After the Mission established a post in Kilenge in 19 29 , 
most migrants were recruited to work at the Mission head-
quarters at Vunapope. The missionaries encouraged wage lab-
our migration as a way to c i v i l i z e the native , to make a 
Christian and a hard worker of him. Sative peoples saw i t 
as a means of gaining access to Western goods, especial ly 
tools and tobacco; v i l lagers encouraged s ingle sons to 
migrate because they depended on remittances for cash to pay 
taxes . 
26, See Grant and Zelenietz (no date) for an analysis of wage 
labour migration from the Kilenge area . 
After the Second World War the contract system ended, 
migrants became responsible for housing and feeding them-
selves and they found it increasingly d i f f i c u l t to save. 
Rabaul replaced Vunapope as the focal point of migration 
because the Mission couldn 't compete with the high wages and 
the opportunities for experiencing urban l i fe offered in 
town. 
For the past twenty years, 20% to 421 of villagers have 
been absent from the village of Ongaia at any given time. 
In 1977, our census of the village indicated that 35% of all 
27 
productive adults, and 43% of all the productive adult 
males, were absent, most for purposes of wage labour. Most 
of the migrants are young single males; women migrate much 
less frequently and for shorter periods. Almost all of the 
men residing in the village migrated at some time in their 
l ives ; the average duration of a migration was six years, 
although most migrants return sporadically for v i s i t s . Cir-
cular migration is the norm in Kilenge: migrants leave with 
the intention to return to the village . Very few villagers 
leave permanently. 
Why do people migrate? Most analyses of wage labour 
migration situations tend to stress the economic aspects of 
the phenomenon. However, i t can be demonstrated that, for 
27. Productive adults are defined as men and women who have 
finished primary school, and are able to contribute 
to their household's production. 
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the Kilenge urban migrant, wage labour is barely a paying 
proposition: he spends as quickly as he earns. Remittances 
of cash and goods seem to have been declining steadily since 
the mid-1960's yet, despite the lack of economic return, 
parents s t i l l countenance migration. Migration behaviour 
has become an accepted social tradition for the Kilenge: a 
passage for young men. I t keeps young men busy 
whereas in the village their labour is often superfluous. 
Page labour teaches them the value of work. In town a man 
must work to eat. lore importantly, it enables older men to 
control the younger men since the length of a man's sojourn 
in town is determined largely by his elders . Older men 
encourage youths to migrate, then, berate the returning 
migrants for their ignorance of village customs and tradi-
tions. Finally, urban migration may serve a latent function 
in that i t limits overcrowding in the village and restricts 
pressure on resources. 
In many native communities, returning migrants play a 
s ignif icant role in social change and in village develop-
ment. This is not the case in Kilenge. nrban migrants often 
return with skills and expertise which could contribute to 
village development. But the traditional social order lim-
its their contribution: only senior men have the right to 
speak at public meetings and to lead in village a f f a i r s . 
Villagers ignore any suggestions for development made by 
recently returned migrants because the proponents are seen 
- 35 -
as too young and unwise to give advice. Since migrants are 
rarely able to accumulate savings , they are seldom in a 
position to individually finance their own projects . Thus, 
their ideas can never bear f r u i t . 
The only positive developmental function which may be 
attributed to urban migration in recent years i s that 
decreased remittances have necessitated a certain level of 
copra production. Tears ago, sons would send cash to cover 
annual tax payments and school fees in the v i l l a g e , but 
today v i l l a g e r s must manufacture enough copra to sell to pay 
their 
COMMENTS, CONCLOSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIOSS 
Why do the Kilenge talk so much about development, but do 
so l i t t l e to bring it about? They are pragmatic people, not 
given to supporting cargo cults or other non-empirical means 
to achieve their goals , yet they have not managed to signi-
ficantly improve their standard of l iving or their level of 
production for export. They share the ideal of wealth and 
success through 'development' (the message of the adminis-
tration) , but they do not believe that the ideal can be 
easily transformed into r e a l i t y ; certainly their previous 
attempts to accommodate the transformation have had l i t t l e 
result other than disillusionment and cynicism. 
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At this point, it may be pertinent for us to ask our-
selves whether the Kilenge really need economic development. 
After a l l , it can be argued that they have limited cash 
needs, that they are relatively self-sufficient (so that 
more cash cropping would simply increase their dependence), 
and more importantly that there may be l i t t le moral justifi-
cation in expecting them to increase thair labour in produc-
tion of goods which are luxuries for foreign markets. But, 
by the same token, we have to remember that this is the 
twentieth century, and Papua New Guinea is an independent 
country which i s striving for some measure of economic 
self-reliance, we cannot turn back the clock so that people 
in the village can return to a state of "primitive afflu-
ence" as it has been called {Clunies Ross, 1971; Sahlins , 
1972) . The Kilenge are not willing to give up their steel 
axes, cotton clothing, imported tea and sugar, hospital , 
mission, or school. They have come to regard some of the 
artifacts and concepts of Western culture as their own. I f 
they hope to keep such paraphernalia, they will have to help 
their government pay the costs. Unless cash crop production, 
light manufacturing ( crafts ) , or animal husbandry can be 
stimulated at the village level in areas like Kilenge, Papua 
New Guinea can never pay its way in the world without a sub-
stantial reduction in the living standards of its people. 
The failure of efforts of the past decade to bring devel-
opment to Kilenge have frustrated and alienated villagers 
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who participated in ill-fated projects. Men who planted 
cocoa and chili peppers, or produced copra which they 
couldn 't market, believe that they have wasted their time. 
They feel that government representatives have lied to them 
or tricked them, and thay will not be fooled again by prom-
ises of wealth and success. Thus, new development projects 
may have been undermined before they can even be drafted , 
let alone implemented. Villagers now distrust the very pos-
sibi l i ty of village development. Past disappointments have 
led many to be fatal ist ic : their villages are going, and can 
go, nowhere. It is obvious that, unless the administration 
takes definite positive measures to try to improve this 
scenario, the Kilenge people cannot hope to contribute to 
the development of Papua New Guinea. 
Although there are saveral recommendations that can be 
offered to development planners who wish to initiate action 
in the Kilenge area, past failures will be d i f f i c u l t to 
overcome, and it will take patient and dedicated local offi-
cers to convince villagers to pay more than lip-service to 
the need for development. Several of the recommendations 
which follow may also be applicable to other areas of Papua 
New Guinea. 
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setore proposing any local development scheme, planners 
and researchers should v i s i t the community to ascertain 
local needs, local preferences and the capabil ity of local 
government representatives to implement programs, given the 
resources they have at hand. They should design projects 
for each particular local context: unless properly adapted 
to needs and c a p a b i l i t i e s , a project has only a limited 
chance of success. Planners should explore alternative 
strategies for development where ' tried and true ' methods 
have f a i l e d . The techniques and concepts of social and 
environmental impact assessment could prove to be valuable 
pre-planning tools for development planners. 
education 
There are many ways in which a development workshop pro-
gram could be a useful planning a id . Many v i l lagers are not 
the 
aware of implications of development. In a workshop forum, 
they could discuss with government planners issues of con-
cern. Why does Papua Mew Guinea need development? Why have 
previous efforts to develop the Kilenge area fa i led? What 
are the impediments to v i l lage development and how can they 
be overcome? Row can development be better suited to vil-
lage conditions? How can the symbols of development {such 
as the trade store and the market) be distinguished from the 
process of development i t s e l f ? The workshop could provide 
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training in useful s k i l l s . O f f i c i a l s could educate villag-
ers for self-help projects , and inform them of alternative 
technologies which are simple, avai lable and inexpensive 
enough to be appropriate for village use. Innovative sug-
gestions from vil lagers for projects which may have economic 
potential should be encouraged. A forure for meaningful dis-
cussion of the issues and problems of development could help 
v i l lagers to understand the ir present dilemma, and might 
provide a foundation on which they could build a viable 
structure for their own v i l l a g e development. 
Sorcery, the wantok system, consumption practices , rapid 
population growth, and the lack of leadership may continue 
to obstruct attempts to develop the v i l lage . But an effec-
tive workshop might be able to disseminate information which 
coulxl encourage i n i t i a t i v e and gradually overcome some of 
the internal l imitations to development. 
PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Government personnel should be well-trained and equipped 
to supervise projects . They should be carefully chosen for 
their assignments, because particular personal and cultural 
characteristics may create special d i f f i c u l t i e s for them in 
some locales ; for example, coastal peoples tend to regard 
Highlanders with suspicion and d istrust . Personnel native 
to an area may, however, experience local unwillingness to 
accept their expertise in important matters; the native son 
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seems less wise in the eyes of his kin than does the 
stranger. Thus, the e f fect ive development of f icer must be 
' d i s t a n t ' enough so that he is cred ib le , but not from an 
area so distant that he seems foreign and foreboding. 
Success may well be frustrated unless infrastructure and 
support systems are avai lable during the implementation of 
projects or plans. Projects 
should be small-scale and simple, so that elaborate coordi-
nation and processing are unnecessary and marketing f a c i l i -
t ies will be readily accessible . 
There should be some revision of existing credit schemes 
for v i l lage development. In the past, business groups had 
l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y in securing loans to open trade s tores , 
while more innovative projects could not be f inanced . Credit 
o f f i c e r s should carefully assess the market potential for 
any project {especially new trade stores , given the record 
of ex ist ing enterprises) before approving f inanc ia l assis-
tance. 
POST-PROJECT ASSESSMENT 
Within a year after a project begins , and at frequent 
intervals throughout the duration of the plan, planners 
should make an evaluation of the progress of the scheme. 
They should re-evaluate the v iabi l ity of the project and 
determine whether they can a l lev iate any problems, or make 
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any improvements. attempt to coordinate future projects 
with existing ones i s essential if rural development is to 
be an integrated, long term process. F inal ly , frequent 
visits and discussions with government planners can provide 
a means whereby villagers have an input into development 
programs; it also guarantees that the planners will be aware 
of the real problems of implementing their ideas at the 
local level . 
Of course, in encouraging the development of cash crop-
ping or other industries in Kilenge, government o f f i c i a l s 
must be cautious not to let food production f a l l , for if 
local communities lose their self-reliance in food produc-
tion then 'developaent1 will prove ultimately self-defeat-
ing . The purpose of development is to augment local and 
national revenues, not to replace food self-sufficiency with 
greater dependence on purchased goods. 
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